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Introduction 
 
 
Charting a New Course on 
North Korea’s Nuclear Programme? 
The Options and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier 
Should North Korea be recognised as a de facto nuclear power? Even after three nuclear 
tests the international discussion continues to tiptoe around this crucial question for 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The aftermath of the spring 2013 escalation only 
makes the problem more urgent. North Korea uses its nuclear weapons as a threat in 
diplomatic and security talks, has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state by constitu-
tional amendment, and most recently openly threatened a nuclear strike against the 
United States and South Korea. Nonetheless, the international community adheres 
doggedly to the legal stance that North Korea is a non-nuclear-weapon state under the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and must renounce nuclear 
arms. Given Pyongyang’s repeated violations of the treaty this position is well founded. 
But in view of the power of the factual, it is legitimate to ask how long this position can 
and should be upheld. Why should the international community not treat North Korea 
like other nuclear powers outside the NPT? 
 
From the point of view of international law 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) must be treated as a non-nuclear-
weapon state. Article 9 of the NPT reserves 
the status of nuclear-weapon state for the 
five nations that manufactured and ex-
ploded a nuclear weapon before 1 January 
1967. North Korea formally confirmed its 
status as a non-nuclear-weapon state in the 
joint declaration of 1992 in which South 
and North Korea agreed to denuclearise the 
Korean Peninsula. 
Until 2007 North Korea was at least 
rhetorically willing to renounce nuclear 
arms. That hope was dashed by the spring 
2013 escalation. After a successful satellite 
launch on 12 December 2012 and its third 
nuclear test on 12 February 2013, North 
Korea wishes to be treated as a nuclear-
weapon state. Kim Jong-un has repeatedly 
stressed that North Korea’s nuclear wea-
pons are no longer negotiable. 
At the same time the risk of military 
conflagration on the Korean Peninsula 
has increased rather than decreased. The 
fruitlessness of efforts to contain North 
Korea’s nuclear risks and security threats 
begs the question of alternatives. Should 
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the international community maintain its 
strategy despite lack of success? Or should 
it accept the facts and recognise North 
Korea as a nuclear-weapon state? The 
danger to peace and stability posed by re-
curring nuclear crises places the United 
States and the international community 
under increasing pressure to justify 
ploughing on with an unaltered North 
Korea policy. It is worth examining the 
pros and cons of both options in the light 
of the declared objectives of that policy: to 
maintain peace and security in East Asia 
while protecting the viability of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. 
Option 1: A New Realism 
An explicit or implicit recognition of North 
Korean possession of nuclear arms would 
fundamentally alter the coordinates of 
the security talks with Pyongyang. Nuclear 
disarmament would no longer be the pre-
condition or immediate goal of talks. There 
would be multilateral acceptance of North 
Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, and the 
demand for its nuclear programme to be 
placed under strict monitoring by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
would be dropped. 
 Pro: Chance for De-escalation and 
International Integration 
Any decision to accept North Korea as a 
nuclear power would certainly represent 
a diplomatic victory for Pyongyang, an 
admission by the United States and the 
international community that their non-
proliferation efforts had failed. But pre-
cisely such a step could open the way for 
progress at the regional level. Acceptance 
of North Korea as a nuclear power would 
have a direct de-escalating effect on the 
Korean conflict, because Pyongyang’s cen-
tral demand for enhanced international 
status would have been fulfilled. 
In the past, a pragmatic approach to 
North Korea’s nuclear capability was al-
ready the basis for progress in negotiations. 
The Agreed Framework of 1994 only came 
into being because the United States re-
frained from insisting on clarification of 
North Korea’s nuclear status. At that time, 
North Korea agreed to renounce nuclear 
weapons in return for the promise of 
annual delivery of 500,000 tonnes of heavy 
fuel oil and the construction of two light-
water reactors (through the Korean Pen-
insula Energy Development Organisation, 
KEDO). In the longer term both sides sought 
mutual diplomatic recognition and a peace 
treaty. The IAEA verified the “freeze” of the 
North Korean nuclear programme. 
In the six-party talks North Korea and 
the United States (together with China, 
Japan, Russia and South Korea) agreed in 
September 2005 and February 2007 on 
North Korean nuclear disarmament in 
exchange for aid supplies and security 
guarantees. Here too, the participants 
did not even try to reach consensus over 
North Korea’s nuclear status. 
One argument for injecting pragmatism 
into dealings with North Korea is thus 
that recognition of its nuclear status is a 
precondition for agreeing a roadmap to 
normalise its relations with the United 
States (as well as with South Korea and 
Japan). In the medium term, fulfilling its 
elementary security demands would do 
more to pave the way for an effective 
integration of North Korea into the inter-
national system than keeping its legal and 
political status under the non-proliferation 
regime ambiguous. Loans from the Asian 
Development Bank, and possibly also re-
paration payments from Japan, could set 
in motion an economic development and 
transformation process in North Korea. 
The energies of the DPRK’s government and 
elite would then be channelled primarily 
into economic improvement and personal 
enrichment rather than diplomatic and 
military confrontation. In the medium to 
long term, the totalitarian regime could 
be induced into more peaceful behaviour 
at home and abroad. 
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 Contra: Dubious Security Gains 
Three reasons mitigate against recognising 
North Korea as a nuclear power: the un-
predictable nature of its domestic and 
foreign policies, the likely impact on the 
regional balance of power, and the negative 
repercussions for the multilateral non-
proliferation regime. 
The expectation that recognition as a 
nuclear power would alter North Korea’s 
external and internal behaviour could 
be fallacious. Even if the country’s status 
were altered, the fundamental conflict 
would remain unresolved: North Korea is 
politically and economically incapable of 
sustaining the kind of national independ-
ence and self-determination it seeks. 
With the country remaining dependent 
on external aid to secure the power of 
party, military and Kim family dynasty, 
the option of extorting foreign aid by diplo-
matic confrontation and nuclear threat 
could remain attractive even after a de 
facto recognition of nuclear status (also to 
drum up domestic support for Kim Jong-
un). North Korea has a track record of 
deceiving the international community, 
working for years on a secret uranium en-
richment programme whose existence it 
only admitted when confronted with US 
intelligence in October 2002. Most recently 
North Korea breached its bilateral 29 Feb-
ruary 2012 Leap Day Agreement with the 
United States in which it agreed, in return 
for food aid, to return to the negotiating 
table and institute a moratorium on 
nuclear weapon and missile tests. 
So even after status-enhancement North 
Korea could continue to export nuclear 
technology or even nuclear material. And 
political and economic liberalisation would 
remain extremely unlikely because the in-
evitable opening to outside media and 
business would expose it to unfavourable 
comparison with the South. 
The discernible and expected responses 
of the United States, China, South Korea 
and Japan to North Korea’s continuing 
nuclear arms programme give reason to 
fear for peace and stability in the region. 
A build-up of additional US military forces 
in the region is foreseeable, as is the risk 
of acceleration of the regional arms race. 
Recognition of the North Korean nuclear 
weapons capability would further reinforce 
that trend. 
While US Defence Secretary Chuck 
Hagel’s 15 March announcement of an-
other fourteen ground-based interceptors 
to be deployed in Alaska to protect the 
continental United States may have been 
directed ostensibly against the threat of 
North Korean long-range missiles, these 
missile defence systems are equally suited 
to intercepting Chinese ICBMs. China must 
fear an expansion of US missile defence 
systems that would undermine its own 
nuclear deterrent, and could seek to ad-
dress that deficit by upgrading its ballistic 
missile systems. 
The strengthening of South Korean and 
Japanese security ties to the United States 
in response to North Korea’s nuclear 
threats also runs counter to China’s stra-
tegic interests. To reinforce the US nuclear 
umbrella both countries would seek closer 
cooperation with the United States. Beijing 
could interpret this as an element of an 
American containment strategy. 
On the other hand, the United States 
would risk harming its alliances with 
South Korea and Japan if it accepted North 
Korea’s nuclear capacity. Both allies could 
harbour increasing doubts about the 
credibility of US defence commitments, 
and would be increasingly likely to expand 
their conventional arsenals in coordination 
with the US, or even to develop their own 
nuclear arms unilaterally. Japan has al-
ready mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, 
South Korea is seeking that capacity. After 
the third North Korean nuclear test it 
required considerable US efforts to per-
suade Seoul to postpone a decision about 
restarting uranium enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing until 2016. 
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North Korea’s Position in the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
As an outsider under the NPT, North Korea 
stood under blanket suspicion from the 
outset. North Korea joined the treaty in 
1985, in exchange for Soviet technology 
transfer for its nuclear plant at Yongbyon, 
but did not accept the IAEA inspections 
prescribed under the NPT until 1992. These 
revealed that North Korea had supplied 
false information and had secretly 
separated plutonium. 
North Korea first declared its withdrawal 
from the NPT on 12 March 1993, during the 
first Korean nuclear crisis. Under Article 10 
of the Treaty, withdrawal is permissible if 
“extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests” of the country. Notice 
of withdrawal and an explanation must be 
given to all treaty members and the UN 
Security Council at least three months in 
advance. 
North Korea “suspended” its withdrawal 
one day before expiry of the three-month 
period, but revoked the suspension on 10 
January 2003, in the course of the second 
nuclear crisis, and declared the country 
ceased to be a member of the NPT with 
effect from 11 January 2003. 
Certain NPT state parties argue that 
North Korea’s withdrawal declarations were 
formally inadmissible, for example because 
it had no right to simply interrupt the 
three-month period of notice in 1993. As far 
as its position under the NPT is concerned, 
North Korea is consequently in diplomatic 
limbo. 
If the international community accepted 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT it 
would be on a par with Israel, India and 
Pakistan, all of which also possess nuclear 
weapons but (unlike North Korea) never 
joined the NPT. That would do lasting harm 
to the non-proliferation regime, destroying 
the trust of the non-nuclear-weapon states 
in the international community’s determi-
nation to take effective, consistent and 
assertive action against rule-breakers. It 
would create the impression that North 
Korea was being rewarded for developing 
nuclear arms secretly and in violation of 
its treaty obligations, and for its course of 
military confrontation. This would send the 
wrong message, especially to Iran which is 
also on the threshold of a nuclear weapons 
capability. 
In response to the North Korean declara-
tion of withdrawal a number of (above all 
Western) states called for the right of with-
drawal from the NPT to be reformed. The 
European Union proposed that the UN 
Security Council should automatically dis-
cuss any withdrawal notice, and that even 
after withdrawal safeguards obligations 
should remain in place on all nuclear tech-
nology acquired during NPT membership. 
Recognition or tacit acceptance of the 
North Korean withdrawal would under-
mine these efforts, as it is hardly conceiv-
able that the other 189 NPT members 
would accept higher hurdles for them-
selves. 
North Korea’s status in the IAEA also 
remains ambivalent. On 13 June 1994, in 
response to the IAEA’s adoption of sanc-
tions, North Korea announced it was with-
drawing from the organisation. But under 
Article 3 of the NPT all non-nuclear-weapon 
signatories must conclude a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA and 
allow international inspections of all their 
nuclear facilities and sensitive materials. 
North Korea now argued that its suspended 
withdrawal gave it a special position in the 
NPT, with no obligation to accept inspec-
tions. The IAEA insists that its safeguards 
agreement with North Korea remains in 
effect whether or not the country is a mem-
ber of the IAEA. 
If the international community were to 
accept North Korea’s interpretation, future 
monitoring of nuclear activities (and verifi-
cation of possible future disarmament 
steps) would require the negotiation of a 
new agreement. As for the NPT nuclear-
weapon states (China, France, Russia, 
United Kingdom and United States) and 
the de facto nuclear powers India, Israel 
and Pakistan, such inspections would occur 
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on a voluntary basis and be limited to 
specific facilities. In other words, inter-
national practice would confirm North 
Korea’s special status as the first state to 
successfully leave the NPT and acquire 
nuclear weapons. 
Option 2: Continuity in Dealings 
with North Korea 
If one accepts the weight of arguments 
against recognising North Korea as a nu-
clear power, there are logical consequences. 
In this case current policy should be main-
tained, demanding complete nuclear dis-
armament and renunciation of its nuclear 
programme as a precondition for talks and 
continuing to refuse to recognise its with-
drawal from the NPT. 
 Pro: Strengthens the Non-
Proliferation Regime 
There are good reasons to regard any con-
cession to North Korea with great scepti-
cism. The negative experience of the past 
makes it difficult to place trust in agree-
ments with the country, and if one takes 
the view that North Korea’s domestic and 
foreign policy is firmly rooted in its politi-
cal and social system there is little reason 
to believe the regime could be reformed 
or tamed. If this scepticism turns out to be 
justified, the international community’s 
requests will remain unfulfilled. In this 
context, America’s hard stance in the nucle-
ar conflict lends credibility to its promises 
to its allies and counteracts possible Japa-
nese and South Korean nuclear ambitions. 
Maintaining existing positions would 
underline the continuity and coherence of 
the international community’s policy to-
wards treaty violators. The message to po-
tential proliferators would be clear: rule-
breakers pay a price, reneging on inter-
national obligations does not pay. Or at 
least brings no enhancement of inter-
national status. 
The Obama administration’s policy of 
“strategic patience” keeps the option of 
North Korea returning to the NPT and IAEA 
open. Even if the latest escalation makes 
such a move unlikely, in the longer term 
a North Korean transformation and re-
nouncement of nuclear arms cannot be 
excluded. 
A policy of continuity would also have 
the advantage of upholding the basic prin-
ciples of international relations in dealings 
with the country, in particular the UN’s 
sanctions resolutions. Although these have 
not prevented North Korea acquiring nu-
clear capacity they have impeded the im-
port of critical technologies and as such 
slowed the North Korean nuclear and 
missile programmes and increased their 
cost. 
 Contra: Inflames Regional Tensions 
Insisting on denuclearisation ignores the 
fact that North Korea already has a nuclear 
weapons capability. If there was any pro-
spect of external pressure and precarious 
living conditions causing the regime in 
Pyongyang to collapse, such a policy would 
nonetheless make sense. But there is little 
sign of such developments. 
The problem here is that the apparently 
unbridgeable gap between rhetoric and 
reality restricts the political and diploma-
tic options for the United States and its 
partners. As long as the international com-
munity insists on North Korea renouncing 
nuclear weapons as a precondition for 
talks, there is no possibility of agreeing 
measures to defuse the tense situation. 
Worse still, in the past North Korea 
has pushed forward with its nuclear pro-
gramme most strongly during phases of 
diplomatic standstill, and is likely to do 
the same in future. To that extent, insisting 
on nuclear disarmament indirectly exacer-
bates regional tensions and increases the 
risk of a military escalation.
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For a Pragmatic Middle Way 
Both absolute insistence on nuclear dis-
armament and absolute forbearance of 
that demand create more problems than 
benefits. It would therefore make sense to 
pursue a middle way where the demand 
is maintained without placing it at the 
centre of direct talks. 
In the multilateral framework the 
international community should continue 
to treat North Korea as an NPT state party, 
and thus as a non-nuclear-weapon state. 
This would avoid harming global efforts to 
control nuclear technologies. In the context 
of United Nations, NPT and IAEA, demands 
for fulfilment of international safeguards 
obligations under Article 3 of the NPT 
should be upheld, and existing Security 
Council resolutions and sanctions should 
be maintained. The lifting of sanctions 
requires complete, irreversible and verifi-
able renunciation of all nuclear weapons 
and programmes and the ending of missile 
tests. 
Bilaterally and plurilaterally, the United 
States and other negotiating partners could 
adopt a more flexible stance on the North 
Korean nuclear programme to overcome 
the diplomatic stalemate and improve their 
political options. There is no need for the 
demand for comprehensive nuclear dis-
armament to be a precondition for direct 
talks or the immediate objective of nego-
tiations. This would make it easier to defuse 
military tensions, keep communication 
channels open, de-escalate the conflict, 
and preserve peace in East Asia. 
Such a policy of conciliation would 
expose the United States in particular to 
charges of “duplicity”. Middle Eastern states 
have long criticised the United States and 
its allies for giving Israel preferential treat-
ment by tacitly accepting its nuclear arms. 
Iran, especially, would likely have a pro-
paganda field day if the negotiating part-
ners were to set aside their demand for 
North Korean disarmament. This criticism 
could be countered by pointing out that 
at the multilateral level the demand for 
nuclear disarmament and North Korea’s 
return to the NPT and the IAEA is being 
upheld. The legal position would thus 
remain fundamentally unaltered. 
Goals of a Dialogue 
The United States has already signalled 
flexibility concerning the future negotiat-
ing format and has not ruled out direct 
talks. North Korea is also willing to talk, 
as Kim’s special envoy Choe Ryong-hae 
indicated to the Chinese leadership at the 
end of May. 
Negotiations with North Korea can only 
be conducted in the knowledge that one 
is not holding too many trumps. The pos-
sibilities of persuading North Korea to 
back down through diplomatic pressure, 
sanctions or military means are limited, 
while North Korea has many means to 
harm China, South Korea and even the 
United States. Where direct talks are con-
cerned, the United States and other possible 
negotiating partners should therefore for-
mulate a catalogue of clear demands in 
return for de facto recognition of nuclear 
status. 
In the short term North Korea must 
make a contribution to military de-escala-
tion. The reopening of the hotline and 
other confidence- and security-building 
measures are important to reduce the risk 
of an unintentional outbreak of military 
hostilities. Participating states could agree 
to exchange information about planned 
military manoeuvres, or perhaps even ob-
servers. It would also be essential for North 
Korea to promise not to conduct any more 
nuclear or missile tests, in order to restrain 
its progress in operationalising nuclear 
capabilities. 
Agreement not to export sensitive tech-
nologies must be made an absolute precon-
dition for de facto recognition of nuclear 
capacity. In the past North Korea has sup-
plied missiles to Iran and Pakistan, possibly 
also nuclear technology to Syria. There re-
mains a risk of it selling nuclear technology 
to other states or even to non-state actors. 
If North Korea’s status were to be enhanced, 
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the regime could have an interest in pre-
senting itself as a “responsible” actor. 
In the medium term, concrete progress 
on the issues of confidence-building, a test 
moratorium and non-proliferation could 
make it easier to move on to other issues of 
mutual interest. To avoid endangering such 
a course, the nuclear problem should ini-
tially remain bracketed out. In the past, 
energy questions, humanitarian aid and 
economic cooperation have already been 
the subject of bi- and multilateral agree-
ments, where Pyongyang hoped above all 
for foreign development aid while the inter-
national community prioritised reducing 
human suffering. In future, promoting a 
process of internal transformation through 
concrete cooperation should be added to 
the objectives, as a lasting solution to the 
North Korea question can only be expected 
if the country changes internally. On the 
basis of such cooperation, questions of nu-
clear disarmament could also be addressed 
in the longer term. 
What Role for Europe? 
Peaceful development in North-East Asia is 
a central German and European interest. 
The voice of Europe must also make itself 
heard in human rights questions. Resolu-
tion of the nuclear conflict with North 
Korea is primarily about averting a military 
– or even nuclear – escalation that would 
have drastic humanitarian consequences. 
Given the close linkages in the global econ-
omy, North-East Asia and Europe would be 
hit hard by any such conflict. Moreover, the 
treatment of North Korea will affect the 
development of the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion regime. Here, strengthening the NPT 
and the IAEA remains an important object-
tive of German foreign and security policy. 
Europe’s influence on the shape of direct 
talks on the North Korean nuclear pro-
gramme has been limited, and that is un-
likely to change fundamentally. Germany 
and the European Union backed the KEDO 
agreement financially, and should indicate 
to the parties that they would similarly sup-
port any new agreement. Europe will play 
an important role – not only out of self-
interest – in integrating North Korea in the 
global economy and possibly even funding 
development there. Germany can offer to 
share its Cold War insights and experience 
of confidence- and security-building mea-
sures with the regional actors. In the inter-
ests of enhancing European credibility it 
might also make sense to conduct this 
transfer of knowledge and experience 
jointly with the former adversary Russia. 
But Germany and the European Union 
are more important as actors in the multi-
lateral non-proliferation regime. Here it 
must be ensured that global disarmament 
and arms control efforts are not under-
mined in the course of resolving the nu-
clear conflict. From the European point of 
view, efforts to accommodate North Korea 
must respect international norms and 
rules, meaning that North Korea cannot 
be formally recognised as a nuclear-weapon 
state. Irreversible and verifiable nuclear dis-
armament must remain the international 
community’s supreme goal. But aside of 
these principles, Europe should put its 
weight behind any pragmatic moves to de-
fuse the confrontation. 
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